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Abstract
How induction was understood took a substan-
tial turn during the Renaissance. At the begin-
ning, induction was understood as it had been
throughout the medieval period, as a kind of
propositional inference that is stronger the
more it approximates deduction. During the
Renaissance, an older understanding, one
prevalent in antiquity, was rediscovered and
adopted. By this understanding, induction
identifies defining characteristics using a pro-
cess of comparing and contrasting.
Important participants in the change were
Jean Buridan, humanists such as Lorenzo Valla
and Rudolph Agricola, Paduan Aristotelians
such as Agostino Nifo, Jacopo Zabarella, and
members of the medical faculty, writers on
philosophy of mind such as the Englishman
John Case, writers of reasoning handbooks,
and Francis Bacon.
Synonyms
epagōgē; inductio
Heritage and Rupture with the Tradition
An understanding of the earlier history of induc-
tion is essential to understanding induction in the
Renaissance, for the story of induction in the
Renaissance is the story of a slow rediscovery of
an earlier – and to us unfamiliar – conception.
Aristotle said that what induction is, is obvious
(Topics, 157a8). It is a proceeding from particulars
to a universal (Topics, 105a13–4). But there is an
ambiguity here. Does Aristotle mean particular
and universal statements? Or does he mean par-
ticular things (or kinds of things) and universal
concepts? Nowadays we presume the first, but
Socrates, who Aristotle says introduced induction
(epagōgē), thought the second. In the Ion
(540b–d), Socrates considered the helmsman,
doctor, cowherd, wool-maker, and military gen-
eral, and concluded that the master of any craft is
one who knows its subject best. This was some
sort of induction but not an inference from a
complete or even incomplete enumeration. This
was a compare-and-contrast process of determin-
ing what it means to say someone is a master.
Once the process is completed, there is no worry
that the next master will not know the craft well,
for we have discovered that this is part of what it
means to be a master. If a man does not know his
material well, he is not a master. The universal
claim is true by definition. But the definition is not
arbitrary or stipulative. It is the conclusion of an
inductive inquiry. (It is what Immanuel Kant said
cannot exist, an analytic a posteriori.) When
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Aristotle said Socrates gets credit for inductive
reasoning and universal definitions, Aristotle
was listing not two unrelated discoveries but two
perspectives on one cognitive operation.
Aristotle’s own methods for identifying formal
cause, as in Book V of the Topics, are methods
of Socratic induction. If Aristotle’s Prior Analyt-
ics is about deduction, his Posterior Analytics is
about induction, and induction of the Socratic
sort. Cicero’s view on induction, too, was
Socratic. It was Cicero who coined the Latin
term in-ductio, on the model of the Greek epa-
gōgē. He would have a large influence on induc-
tion in the Renaissance. Others in the ancient
world agreed with Aristotle and Cicero. Indeed,
the Socratic understanding of what induction is
was conventional all through Greek, Hellenistic,
and early Roman antiquity.
This understanding got switched around by the
Neoplatonists of late antiquity. They read
Aristotle’s particulars and universals as about par-
ticular and universal statements, not particular
things and universal concepts. The change started
with Clement of Alexandria in the second century.
He said that a definition is a summation and there-
fore that induction obtains force not by comparing
and contrasting but by completely enumerating
components. In Alexandria, around 500 AD,
Ammonius Hermiae and his students Simplicius
and John Philoponus incorporated Clement’s
view into their comprehensive reworking of Aris-
totle. In their Neoplatonic synthesis, induction can
be reduced to a kind of deduction. The deduction
has the form of a syllogism with a minor premise
suppressed. The minor premise is the presumption
that all particulars have been enumerated. (The
proposal found support in Aristotle’s Prior Ana-
lytics B 23, but only because the Alexandrians
read that difficult chapter in a new way. All other
mentions in Aristotle’s corpus indicate Aristotle
had a Socratic conception.)
The Alexandrian, Neoplatonic, non-Socratic
understanding of induction was transmitted
through the medieval period in both Latin and
Arabic. In this conception, induction is a kind of
propositional inference. That is, the particulars are
not particular concepts or things but particular
statements (e.g., this magnet attracts iron; that
magnet attracts iron; the other magnet attracts
iron) and the universals are universal statements
(e.g., all magnets attract iron). And unless the
enumeration is complete, the conclusion cannot
be certain. While nowadays we use white swans
and an Australian black swan to demonstrate the
fragility of such induction, Scholastics used the
jaws of animals: This animal chews bymoving the
lower jaw; that animal does; the other animal
does. If we conclude that all animals chew by
moving the lower jaw, the conclusion will be
overturned when we discover the Nile crocodile,
for it moves the upper jaw.
For an example of a reliable induction, Ock-
ham (c. 1287–1347) used the Holy Trinity: What
is true of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is true of
God. The enumeration is complete. Scholastics
recognized that an incomplete enumeration
could be made complete by adding et cetera to
the list of particulars. Formally, this allowed the
induction to be rendered as a deduction, but in
practice of course it does not do much. Whether
that et cetera is exhaustive is the very question
at hand. (Ockham, Summa logicae, III.3.31–7)
In the Renaissance, the established, Alexan-
drian, Scholastic conception of induction was
increasingly questioned.
Ockham’s younger contemporary Jean
Buridan (before 1300–c. 1360) claimed that with
or without the et cetera, an induction by enumer-
ation of particular statements is not really an
induction at all, or at most it is just a special
case. He espied in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
B 19 a completely different conception of induc-
tion. Here induction seems to be the process of
coming to know universals in a hierarchical pro-
cess of combining sensations to form memories,
memories to form experiences, and experiences to
form universals. By this we come to know that
every fire is hot, that every magnet attracts iron,
that all rhubarb purges bile, that everything that
comes to be in nature comes to be from some
preexisting subject, and so on for many other
indemonstrable principles. These are known true
not by extending a sufficiently long list of obser-
vation statements, but by discovering the very
nature of fire, magnets, rhubarb, natural subjects,
and so on. To make his point, Buridan used
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Socrates’ example of the master in a discipline.
(Buridan, Summulae, 6.1.4, 6.1.5, and 8.5.4)
Buridan had discovered the alternate concep-
tion of induction in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
but the conception is even plainer and more per-
vasive in Aristotle’s Topics, the foundational text
for a Renaissance approach to reasoning that
scholars now call topics-logic. The humanists
Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) and Rudolph
Agricola (1443/4–1485) were influential advo-
cates of this approach.
In induction, Valla mocked any attempt to get
around a limited enumeration by adding et cetera
or the like; indeed he mocked any attempt to treat
induction as a defective sort of deduction. He
insisted on returning to the views of induction
advocated by Cicero and Socrates. Valla said Boe-
thius (d. c. 526 AD), who had advocated the
Neoplatonic Alexandrian conception, was like
someone who has stolen a horse and tries to hide
the theft by cutting and dyeing the horse’s hair.
What Boethius was peddling, Valla said, was sim-
ply not true induction. (Valla, Repastinatio, 3.16)
While Valla was dismissive, Agricola was
accommodating. He sought a taxonomy that
offered a place to both the Scholastic convention
and the rediscovered ancient. He proposed to call
the conventional inference enumeratio and to use
inductio for the ancient, open-ended procedure.
For the second, he treated Socrates, Cicero, and
Aristotle’s Topics as the authorities. (Agricola, De
Inventione Dialectica, 2.18)
Innovative and Original Aspects
Buridan, Valla, Agricola, and other challengers
did not immediately unseat the conventional
understanding of induction. Buridan’s writings
on the subject barely circulated and were never
printed. Although Valla criticized the conven-
tional view of induction, he did not have much
to say on the alternative. He died in 1457. Agric-
ola died in 1485, his De Inventione Dialectica not
yet printed. Into the 1480s, 30 years after the
invention of printing, almost everything one
would read on induction still presented the con-
ventional Scholastic account whereby induction is
a defective kind of syllogism made good by com-
plete enumeration, actual or presumed.
But during the 1480s newly published texts
began to undermine that account. In 1484, all of
the Socratic dialogues became available in
Marsilio Ficino’s new Latin translation. It thus
became easier to see what Aristotle meant when
he said Socrates introduced induction. In the
1490s, commentaries on Aristotle became more
comprehensive. New attention to the Posterior
Analytics and the Topics disrupted long-held
views of what Aristotle had thought about induc-
tion. Editions of Cicero’s Topics, with its plainly
Socratic view of induction, were frequently
printed. Valla’s Repastinatio Dialectice et
Philosophie came into print. Agricola’s De
Inventione was published in 1515. By the 1540s,
students of induction were faced with multiple
traditions and inconsistent interpretations. While
Aristotle had said that what induction is, is obvi-
ous, the Renaissance Paduan Agostino Nifo, in a
commentary on the Topics published in 1535 and
several times thereafter, disagreed. He noted that
the very nature of induction was now in dispute
(Nifo, 1.68).
The tension is evident in logic textbooks in
England. Since Peter of Spain’s Tractatus of the
mid-thirteenth century, induction had a conven-
tional place in logic textbooks. It was treated
briefly, as a derivative of deduction, along with
enthymeme and example. After extended treat-
ment of the syllogism, induction would get a few
short paragraphs, maybe one page. John Seton’s
Dialectica, first published in London in 1545 was
different. The treatment of induction was three
pages long, wide-ranging, and eclectic. Seton
began conventionally enough but then introduced
newer examples, one that the Protestant
Philipp Melanchton (1497–1560) had recently
used. Seton added the requirement that in a valid
induction, no counter examples be observed. He
compared induction to deduction in ways Aris-
totle had. He echoed remarks Agricola had made
and reported on Agricola’s proposal to use the
word enumeratio. He brought in the new topics-
logic and cited Cicero and Plato. Nearly all the
traditions and subtraditions on induction made
an appearance in this one place, but Seton
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made no attempt to integrate them. (Seton, “De
Inductione,” Dialectica)
Thomas Wilson tried. His Rule of Reason was
the first logic textbook in English. The first edition
was published in London in 1551 and except for
characteristically Protestant examples and use of
some of Agricola’s language, what Wilson said
about induction in that edition was not particularly
unusual. This changed, however, with the second
edition, “newly corrected,” printed only 1 year
later, in 1552. In its treatment of induction,Wilson
added a second section, larger than all of his
original treatment, on what he said is another
kind of induction, one that the learned call Socra-
tes’ induction. The presentation, while not partic-
ularly insightful, echoes Agricola and tries to
incorporate the developing enthusiasm for the
new alternative to Scholastic induction. (Wilson,
Rule of Reason, 1551, “Inductio”; 1552,
“Inductio,” fol. 66.)
Such enthusiasm was growing in Padua among
the medical faculty. William Harvey, a student at
Padua in 1600, called the medical faculty’s new
method regula Socratis, the rule of Socrates. His
teachers understood it as a revival of ideas Aris-
totle had developed in his biological works and in
the Posterior Analytics. Using this method, one
formed universal statements by identifying the
essence of something, and in the case of anatom-
ical organs, this essence was the organ’s function.
Such essence was discovered by careful dissec-
tion and experimentation and a thoroughly
Socratic process of comparing and contrasting.
(Cunningham)
An opponent of this new inductive science was
Jacopo Zabarella, professor of natural philosophy
and Padua’s most distinguished logician. In the
early twentieth century, Ernst Cassirer and then
John Herman Randall proposed that Zabarella’s
so-called regressus theory included an influential
new theory of induction. A recently published
modern edition and English translation of
Zabarella’s relevant works shows that induction
played no significant role in regressus theory and
what Zabarella had to say about induction was in
fact designed to thwart advance of the new con-
ception. (Zabarella)
In England, the new thinking on induction was
bolstered by John Case in his logic textbook
Summa veterum interpretum of 1584 and in his
treatise Lapis Philosophicus of 1599. In the first,
he brings Aristotle’s four causes, including the
formal cause (central to Socratic induction), into
the discussion of induction, even if only perfunc-
torily. In the second, he explores the Aristotelian
idea that abstract ideas are known at first only
confusedly (confuse) and then, after sufficient
cogitation, come to be known distinctly
(distincte). What is important about Case’s pre-
sentation is not the content, but the terminology.
Notio (and its cognate notitia) are used more fre-
quently than in the past. The term will be central
for Bacon. Furthermore, Case calls the ill-formed
abstractions known only confusedly “abstract
phantasms” or “idols,” another concept central
for Bacon. (Case, 1584, 1.19; 1599, 1.1, 2.1.3)
Francis Bacon (1561–1626), one of the most
influential writers on induction and scientific
method in Western philosophy, entered a conver-
sation that was already underway. His Novum
Organum (1620) was cast in the language of that
conversation. His contribution was to systematize
and fully revive Socratic induction. In doing so,
he brought to maturity the Renaissance reconcep-
tualization of induction.
Bacon came to induction late and indirectly, for
his initial interest was not primarily epistemolog-
ical but practical. He sought some method by
which someone could confidently make things
that had never been made before. The method
would need to ensure two things, what he called
certainty and liberty. The first, Bacon thought,
was easy, if one ignores the second. It takes no
great genius or much method, for example, to
know that heat melts butter (not Bacon’s example;
his involved making something white). The next
dollop thrown on the skillet will melt. We can
continue doing what we have always done, and
we know what will happen. But what of cheese?
What about wax? Clay? Will it behave the same?
What about a new artificial material, envisioned
but not yet produced? As we exercise our liberty,
as we try things increasingly dissimilar, we lose
our certainty – at least without a proper method.
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Bacon wanted a method that would allow liberty
without sacrificing certainty.
To solve his problem Bacon turned to
Aristotle’s concepts of kata pantos and katholou
proton. A property that is true kata pantos is true
for all members of a class. But a property that is
true katholou proton is true of all and only all
members of a class. Thus a proposition predicat-
ing a katholou proton property is convertible; that
is, subject and predicate can be swapped. All tri-
angles have angles that sum to 180, and any
polygon whose angles sum to 180 is a triangle.
This suggests a rule: If you want a polygon whose
angles sum to 180, make a triangle. But even if
the properties are katholou proton, the rule may
not be useful. Having a flat surface, feeling
smooth, appearing bright, and being able to see
your face in it may all be katholou proton proper-
ties of a metal, but to make a metal all of these,
you need to know which causes the others, or, to
use Bacon’s term, which is more “original.” It is
not enough to know that properties “cluster and
concur”; it is important to identify which is the
cause. But which cause? Bacon considers
Aristotle’s four. He dismisses the final cause as
inapplicable in cases outside of human actions.
And he thinks knowing just the material and effi-
cient causes can provide certainty but not liberty.
That knowledge helps only to “achieve new dis-
coveries in material which is fairly similar.” What
is needed, Bacon says, is to identify the “form or
formal cause.” The formal cause is what makes
something the kind of thing it is; it identifies the
Socratic essence. Bacon says that “Aristotle’s
school” – by which he meant Scholastic advocates
of the Neoplatonic Alexandrian
Aristotelianism – was right “that there is no true
knowledge but by causes, no true cause but the
form, no true form known except one.” But
Aristotle’s school misunderstood the form and
consequently – and wrongly – regarded its dis-
covery as hopeless. (Bacon 1857, p. 325)
A form, Bacon says, is merely a particular
arrangement and motion of (frequently impercep-
tible) physical components. In Book 2 of the
Novum Organum, Bacon presents a method for
identifying that arrangement and motion. He says
the search should begin with a comprehensive
inventory of observed instances, related absences,
and related variations. He offers 27 kinds of obser-
vations (“prerogatives”) that are particularly valu-
able for discovering the essence or formal cause of
something. When he uses his method to discover
the formal cause of heat, he concludes that heat is
a particular kind of motion of imperceptible par-
ticles. He then makes the remarkable claim:
If in any body you can arouse a motion . . . [of this
certain kind], you will certainly generate heat. It is
irrelevant whether the body is elementary
(so-called) or imbued with heavenly substances;
whether luminous or opaque; whether rare or
dense; whether spatially expanded or contained
within the bounds of its first size; whether tending
toward dissolution or in a steady state; whether
animal, vegetable or mineral, or water, oil or air,
or any other substance whatsoever. (Bacon 1620,
book 2, aphorism 20, Silverthorne translation, fol-
lowing Bacon’s highlighting.)
From an analysis of particulars, Bacon came to
a tremendously universal conclusion, one of both
certainty and liberty. He came to call his method a
kind of induction.
Bacon stresses that this particular kind of
motion is not the efficient cause of heat, that is,
it is not the case that there is one thing, the motion,
that produces another thing, the heat. Rather the
particular kind of motion is what heat is. If you
can produce this kind of motion, you produce
heat, because the motion and the heat are the
same thing. Motion (the genus) and the particular
kind of it (the species) define heat, but the defini-
tion is discovered not stipulated. Inductive science
becomes the search for universal statements
warranted by concepts properly defined by essen-
tial characteristics. Baconian “idols” are ill
formed and poorly defined abstractions. Induction
(of the Socratic type) provides the needed remedy.
For Bacon an induction is warranted not by
positive instances that confirm, but by compari-
sons that contribute to the definition of the predi-
cate. Finding that definition by this process of
compare-and-contrast is the essence of Socratic
induction. It was this to which Bacon referred
when he said, “[The correct procedure] has not
yet been done, nor even certainly tried except only
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by Plato, who certainly makes use of this form of
induction to some extent in settling on definitions
and ideas” (Bacon 1620, book 1, aphorism
105, Silverthorne translation).
Impact and Legacy
Baconian induction became canonical in natural
philosophy. An important early practitioner was
Robert Boyle (1627–91), a candidate for the title
of first modern chemist. He said the use of exper-
imental induction to find the formal cause of
chemical properties was the “noblest” and “most
important” part of natural philosophy. In 1837,
William Whewell looked back on 200 years of
scientific progress and gave Baconian induction
the credit. Even David Hume accepted the Baco-
nian conception. He never used “induction” to
name the object of his epistemological doubts.
That is a recent attribution. It was only after
John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic (1843) that
the Scholastic conception returned and again
became standard. (Ducheyne and McCaskey)
Writers on induction in the Renaissance were
not trying to solve the “problem of induction” that
we talk about. If anything went by that name in
Renaissance philosophy, it was merely the prob-
lem of how to form good abstractions and to
define by essentials. The Renaissance project fin-
ished with Bacon’s proposal on how to do so.
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